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Abstract
This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insur-
ance (UI) policies. We examine three diﬀerent means of improving
the eﬃciency of UI: the duration of beneﬁt payments, monitoring in
conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop
a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model fea-
tures worker heterogeneity in preferences for leisure. The numerical
analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions re-
stores search incentives most eﬀectively, since it brings additional
incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore,
the UI provider can oﬀer a more generous UI replacement rate in a
system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems.
Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems.
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2 Optimal unemployment insurance design1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Theoretical modeling of unemployment insurance (UI) has typically fo-
c u s e do nt h eb e n e ﬁt level or the replacement rate, i.e., the fraction of
earnings replaced by unemployment beneﬁts. Of course, the design of an
optimal UI system raises many other issues. For example, should there be
a time limit on beneﬁt receipt? To what extent should beneﬁtr e c i p i e n t s
be induced to follow prescribed search requirements? Is there a case for a
work requirement in exchange for beneﬁts?
The present paper contributes to the welfare analysis of UI by ana-
lyzing three diﬀerent means of improving the eﬃciency of UI. The ﬁrst
instrument is the duration of beneﬁt payments, or more generally the
time sequencing of beneﬁts; the second is monitoring in conjunction with
sanctions; and the third is workfare. The purpose is to oﬀer a framework
that allows a comparison of the three instruments in a coherent fashion.
Needless to say, an exhaustive discussion of UI design should also consider
other issues, such as modes of ﬁnancing and entitlement rules, issues that
are ignored in the present paper.
The question of time sequencing of beneﬁts is about whether beneﬁts
should be paid at a ﬁx e dr a t eo v e rt h es p e l lo fu n e m p l o y m e n to rd e c l i n e( o r
increase) over the spell. This issue appeared in the literature on optimal
UI in the late 1970s and has attracted new attention in recent research.1
Issues regarding monitoring and sanctions concern how much resources
should be spent on checking search behavior and how sanctions, such as
beneﬁt cuts, should be implemented if prescribed search requirements are
not met. These questions have been discussed in policy circles but only
rarely been the subject of research.2
Workfare — the requirement that a beneﬁt recipient participate in some
work activity in exchange for beneﬁts — has been on the policy agenda for
1Shavell and Weiss (1979) is the seminal paper in this area. More recent studies
include Wang and Wiliamson (1996), Davidson and Woodbury (1997), Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997), Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001).
2Recent theoretical papers include Boone and van Ours (2000) and Boone et al.
(2002). A growing number of empirical studies suggest that monitoring in conjunction
with sanctions can have substantial behavioral eﬀects. See Abbring et al. (1998), van
d e nB e r ge ta l .( 2 0 0 4 )a n dL a l i v ee ta l .( 2 0 0 2 )f o re v i d e n c eo nt h ee ﬀects of sanctions.
Several randomized experiments from the United States indicate that more stringent
search requirements reduce the duration of beneﬁt receipt (Johnson and Kleppinger,
1994; Benus and Johnson, 1997).
Optimal unemployment insurance design 3a very long time; indeed, examples of workfare in France and Britain can
be traced centuries back (Besley and Coate, 1992). Workfare has been
scrutinized in the public ﬁnance literature on poverty alleviation (Besley
and Coate 1992, 1995). In the context of UI, workfare has sometimes
been discussed in conjunction with active labor market policies (Jackman,
1994). One idea in this discussion is that labor market programs can
be useful to implement the work test of UI. Although the idea has been
around for some time, it has not been subject to much rigorous formal
analysis.3
In this paper we formulate a quantitative model of equilibrium un-
employment within which each of the three policy instruments can be
examined. The model extends the analyses of Fredriksson and Holm-
lund (2001), Boone and van Ours (2000), and Boone et al. (2002) by
incorporating worker heterogeneity and by enlarging the set of policy in-
struments. Worker heterogeneity appears as diﬀerences in preferences for
leisure. The motivation for this approach is the desire to shed light on the
role of workfare as a screening device. When workers diﬀer in their pref-
erences for leisure, they will also diﬀer with respect to their search eﬀort.
However, search eﬀort is unobserved by the insurer — or at least observed
imperfectly — and UI beneﬁts can therefore not be directly conditioned on
search. If search indeed were observed one would expect that an optimal
UI policy would reward active and penalize less active search. Workfare
schemes may conceivably be useful as a means to encourage UI beneﬁcia-
ries to engage in active job search. To our knowledge, no earlier study
has systematically explored the performance of workfare in comparison to
other conceivable policy instruments.
The next section presents the basic theoretical framework. Throughout
we rule out the possibility of self-insurance via privates savings during
employment. This omission partly reﬂects the strive for a tractable model.
The possibility of savings may aﬀect the desirability of reducing beneﬁt
generosity over the course of the unemployment spell (e.g. Hassler and
Rodriguez Mora, 2002). But in the present paper we are interested in
3The recent paper by Thustrup Kreiner and Tranæs (2004) is an exception. Several
empirical studies have found support for the idea that workfare works as a screening
device. The study by Black et al. (2003) indicates that the mere threat of being placed in
a labor market program can reduce time spent on UI and boost job ﬁndings. The results
reported by Benus and Kleppinger (1997) point in the same direction. Fredriksson and
Holmlund (2003) oﬀer a survey of recent literature on how to improve incentives in UI.
4 Optimal unemployment insurance designcomparing instruments that all have the ﬂavour of reducing the generosity
of UI compensation over the unemployment spell. Therefore, we do not
think that the omission of savings will bias this comparison in a substantive
way.
Section 3 turns to the welfare analysis. This analysis suggests that
a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most
eﬀectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to
avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can oﬀer a more generous
UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in
the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two
systems.
2 The model
The model extends the analysis in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) by
incorporating individual heterogeneity. We consider heterogeneity in pref-
erences for leisure, i.e. the same form of heterogeneity as Beaudry and
Blackorby (1998) and Thustrup Kreiner and Tranæs (2004).
2.1 Utility functions and labor market transitions
We follow Thustrup Kreiner and Tranæs (2004) in assuming that there
are only two types of individuals: workers (w) and non-workers (n). For





i + δi ln 
j
i (1)
where c denotes consumption and   leisure. The marginal rate of sub-
stitution between consumption and leisure diﬀers between workers and
non-workers. In particular we assume that δw <δ n.T h i s d i ﬀerence in
turn implies diﬀerent levels of consumption and leisure for workers and
non-workers. We will make the extreme assumption that non-workers do
not search for a job unless the monetary compensation outside employ-
ment becomes unreasonably low. This, in turn, implies that a non-worker
will never be employed.
There are four potential states (j): employment (e), unemployment
i n s u r a n c e( U I )r e c e i p t( u), participation in workfare (p), or unemploy-
Optimal unemployment insurance design 5ment assistance (UA) receipt (a).4 Associated with each state is a present
discounted value, V
j
i , j = e,u,p,a.
To preserve tractability we assume that consumption equals income in
each instant, i.e., individuals cannot save nor borrow. Consumption and
























where w denotes the aggregate wage and sk
i , k = u,p,a, search intensity.
b and z are the replacement rates provided by the unemployment beneﬁt
system and p is the time requirement on workfare.5 We take work-hours
to be ﬁxed and independent of the wage, so  e
i =  , and compensation on
UI and workfare to be greater than unemployment assistance i.e., b ≥ z.6
2.1.1 Workers
An employed worker is separated from his job at an exogenous Poisson
rate, φ. A spell of employment immediately qualiﬁes for UI beneﬁts. The
job oﬀer arrival rate for individuals outside employment depends on search
intensity and the aggregate state of the market. For individuals in state
k,j o bo ﬀers arrive at the rate sk
i α.T h e o ﬀer arrival rate conditional
on search, α, is a market variable that we endogenize later on. Finally,
UI recipients are transferred to UA or workfare at the rate µπ(su
i ). We
interpret this transition rate below.
Having deﬁned the relevant transition rates and the compensation in
each state we can write the value functions for workers as follows
rV e
w = υe
w + φ(V u
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w]( 3 )
4We refer to this state as unemployment assistance. But one could equally well think
of it as social assistance (welfare) or any other income of last resort.
5We refer to w as the wage although it is in fact wage income, i.e., the wage rate
times hours of work.
6If workers choose their working time, taking the hourly wage as given, work-hours
— and thus leisure — will be independent of the wage. In particular, leisure will be given
by  
e
w = δw/(1 + δw).
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w)( 5 )
where r is the subjective rate of time preference. Equations (2)-(5) em-
body the assumptions that time is continuous and individuals have inﬁnite
horizons.
2.1.2 Non-workers
S i n c en o n - w o r k e r sd on o ts e a r c h( b ya s s u m p t i o n )w eh a v esk
n =0a n dt h e
employment state is not relevant for non-workers. The asset values for
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n = υp
n + ϕ(V u




n + ϕ(V u
n − V a
n )( 8 )
The interpretation (6) is analogous to (3) (apart from the fact that a non-
worker does not search). While receiving UI, non-workers enjoy the direct
utility of υu
n.U Ie x p i r e sa tt h er a t eµπ(su
n) and the non-workers are then
transferred to UA or workfare.
Now, consider the interpretation of (7) and (8). Non-workers receive
the direct utility of υ
p
n while being on workfare and υa
n when receiving




n; analogously they escape UA for UI at the same rate and
enjoy a gain of V u
n − V a
n. Thus, there is some “churning” of non-workers
among the three unemployment states. In this way we ensure that UA (or
workfare) does not become an absorbing state for non-workers in situations
where the UI expiration rate (µπ(su
n)) is strictly positive. The assumption
ϕ>0 is a shortcut that incorporates the idea that non-workers may claim
entitlement to UI by faked employment records. Non-workers may get
some job oﬀers even if they don’t search. Since they (by assumption) are
not willing to supply eﬀort on the job, they will lose their jobs at rates
that are very high, possibly inﬁnitely high. There is a positive probability
that a non-worker gets UI if the UI case-worker cannot determine whether
such transitions represent genuine job destructions or quits.
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The three institutions that we consider come out as speciﬁcw a y so fm o d -
eling the asset value of being on UI.
Time limits Consider ﬁrst the system with time limits in UI receipt.
A convenient way of parameterizing such a system is as follows: Write
the stochastic termination rate as being independent of su
i ,i . e . ,π(su
i )=1




w, i.e., workers (and hence non-
workers) prefer UA over workfare. In this incarnation, the model features
stochastic duration of beneﬁt receipt; the expected potential duration of
unemployment insurance receipt is (1/µ ). Using this modeling strat-
egy we avoid the non-stationarities associated with ﬁxed duration that
complicates the model without adding much insight; see Fredriksson and
Holmlund (2001).
Monitoring and sanctions Consider next the system with monitor-
ing and sanctions. Recipients of UI beneﬁts are monitored with respect
to their search behavior at the Poisson rate µ. Monitoring is a random
inspection of an individual’s search activity. Given monitoring, there is
some probability that the observed search eﬀort does not meet the search
requirement, in which case the worker is sanctioned and transferred to
state a.T h u s ,µπ(su
i ) is the probability of being sanctioned per unit time
given that the individual is monitored and supplies su
i units of search. In
sum, the system with monitoring and sanctions is parameterized as fol-
lows: the termination rate of UI beneﬁt receipt is a decreasing function of
search, ∂π(su
i )/∂su





For practical purposes, we choose π(su
i )=1− σsu
i as our parameteri-
zation of the sanctioning probability. To ensure that π is a proper prob-
ability, we take σ to be bounded by the unit interval, that is, σ ∈ [0,1].
This restriction implies that there is a positive probability of being sanc-
tioned for all values of su
i . In other words the monitoring technology is
plagued by Type II errors — some complying individuals are sanctioned.
The parameter σ measures to which extent the sanction probability de-
pends on an agent’s own search eﬀort. One way to interpret σ is that
it indexes the precision of the inspection technology. A simple example
may illustrate why it is useful to think of σ as an indicator of the preci-
sion of the inspection technology. Consider the extreme case when σ =0 .
8 Optimal unemployment insurance designThis case mirrors the situation where beneﬁt administrators roll a dice
to determine whether the monitored individual has searched to rule or
not. The inspection technology is thus completely random from the job
searcher’s perspective. In this case, the monitoring and sanctions system
is equivalent to our incarnation of a system with ﬁnite duration of UI ben-
eﬁt receipt. We can therefore meaningfully compare the two systems by
changing one parameter.
Workfare Consider ﬁnally a system with workfare. Individuals are ran-
domly subjected to a work test at rate µ.G i v e na no ﬀer to participate in
workfare, they choose max(V
p
i ,Va
i ). For a workfare system to be operative









n .T h a t
is, the time requirement should be set such that workers opt for workfare
while non-workers prefer unemployment assistance. Thus a workfare sys-
tem is deﬁned by π(su
i ) = 1 and the self-selection constraints V
p






2.1.4 Worker search behavior
Workers determine search in an atomistic fashion, i.e., by taking all wages
and the oﬀer arrival rate conditional on search, α, as given. In general,





w − V u
w)+µσ(V u
w − V a
w)( 9 )
The left-hand-side of (9) represents the marginal cost of search, that is,
the marginal utility of leisure, while the right-hand-side constitutes the
marginal return to search. The marginal return has two components: the
ﬁr s tt e r mr e f e r st oa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ej o bo ﬀer arrival rate and the second
term to a reduction in the transition rate to UA. The systems with a time
limit and workfare have σ = 0, so the second component never appears
in the marginal return to search. Optimal search for individuals in the





w − V m
w ),m = p,a (10)
Non-workers do not search at all so for them it must be true that δn is
strictly greater than the marginal return to search in each state.
Optimal unemployment insurance design 92.1.5 Flow equilibrium
We restrict attention to a steady state environment. There are ﬂow equi-
librium constraints that deﬁne the rates of employment and unemployment
in the working population. For instance, the employment rate among































where I(·) is the indicator function (I(·) = 1 if the expression within
parenthesis is true) and λj
w = u
j
w/(1 − ew) is the number of workers in
state j relative to non-employment.
Non-workers are never employed. Independently of which of the three







where µ is a policy parameter that will be determined optimally. We
assume that ϕ is exogenously given for the UI provider.7
2.2 Matching and wage determination
The equilibrium in the model has an endogenous wage (w)a n da ne n -
dogenous oﬀer arrival rate conditional on search (α). We endogenize
w and α by specifying a matching technology and a wage bargaining
model. With respect to the matching technology we make the stan-
dard assumptions that the matching function, h = h(sw,v) is of the con-
stant returns to scale variety and increasing in both arguments. The “in-












w ≤ V a
w)sa
wua
w, and the number of
vacancies (v). The probability of ﬁnding a job conditional on search is
then α(θ)=h(sw,v)/sw,w h e r eθ ≡ (v/sw) is a measure of labor market
tightness. Firms ﬁll vacancies at the rate q(θ)=h(sw,v)/v = h(1/θ,v).
It is straightforward to verify that α0(θ) > 0a n dq0(θ) < 0, i.e. the tighter
the market the easier it is for workers to ﬁnd jobs and the more diﬃcult
it is for ﬁrms to ﬁnd workers.
7In the monitoring and sanctions system the hazard rate out of UI for non-workers
is µπ(s
u
n)=µ since non-workers do not search.
10 Optimal unemployment insurance designWages are determined in individual bargaining between the worker
and the ﬁrm. To determine the outcome of the wage bargain we must also
specify ﬁrm values. The government ﬁnances unemployment expenditure
by a proportional payroll tax (τ)l e v i e do nﬁrms. Labor productivity is
constant and given by y. The cost of holding a vacancy open is κy,w i t h
κ>0. The value functions take the usual form
rJv = −κy + q(θ)(Je − Jv) (13)
rJe = y − w(1 + τ)+φ(Jv − Je) (14)
where Jv is the asset value of a vacant job and Je the asset value of an
occupied job. Since there is no cost of entering and exiting the vacancy
market, a free entry condition, Jv = 0, determines the number of vacancies
in the market. From the free entry condition we obtain the wage cost,
wc ≡ w(1 + τ), as proportional to the marginal product of labor:
wc =[ 1− (r + φ)(κ/q(θ))]y ≡ d(θ)y
We refer to wc = d(θ)y as the zero-proﬁt condition. It speciﬁes a negative
relationship between wc and θ, d0(θ) < 0, since wage costs have to be lower
in a tighter market in order to be consistent with zero proﬁts.
Now consider wage determination. Given that bargaining is conducted
at the individual level, the wage is given by
w =a r gm a x[ V e
w(w) − V u
w]
β [Je(w) − Jv]
1−β
where β ∈ (0,1) is a measure of worker bargaining power. Imposing
symmetry and the equilibrium condition, Jv = 0, we write the outcome
of the wage bargain as
V e







The model has a convenient recursive structure where the zero-proﬁt
condition and equation (15) determine θ and wc.T o s e e t h i s , n o t e t h a t
free entry of vacancies implies Je = κy/q(θ). The right-hand side of (15)
is thus increasing in θ but independent of s
j
w. The left-hand side of (15)
is a function of θ. But it is independent of w, given our chosen utility
function and constant replacement rates. Moreover, it can be shown that
it is independent of s
j
w when the ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal search
Optimal unemployment insurance design 11are invoked. With tightness determined, we get s
j
w from (9) and (10),
recognizing that the wage does not aﬀect the diﬀerences in present values.
With θ and s
j
w determined, we get the unemployment and employment
rates from the ﬂow equilibrium conditions. As we have set up the model,
taxes do not aﬀect search and unemployment.
2.3 Welfare
We are interested in Pareto optimal UI policies. The objective of the UI
provider is to maximize the expected utility of workers subject to non-
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This is the relevant objective if there is no discounting because then ﬁrm
values are irrelevant. We ignore discounting in order to validly compare
alternative steady states without considering the adjustment process.
The ﬁnal piece of the model is the government budget constraint. In
general, it takes the form
γτeww = γ[uu
wbw + I(V p
w >Va
w)up
wbw + I(V p






where γ is the worker share of the population. The left-hand-side of (17)
represents the revenues from the payroll tax. The right-hand-side consti-
tutes unemployment expenditure. The ﬁrst component, in square brack-
ets, refers to unemployment expenditure in relation to the worker pop-
ulation and the second component is compensation paid to non-workers.
Notice that in specifying the compensation to non-workers we have di-
rectly imposed that a viable workfare policy must screen out non-workers,
implying that workfare is never an option for them. C(·), the real re-
source cost of running the monitoring and sanctions system, is assumed
to be given by
C = c(σ)µ(γuu
w +( 1− γ)uu
n)w (18)
where c(σ) ≥ 0( c0(σ) > 0a n dc(0) = 0) is the marginal cost of monitoring.
Costs are increasing in the number of monitored individuals (µ(γuu
w+(1−
γ)uu
n)); the sanction itself commands no resources. As argued above, σ
can be interpreted as indexing the precision of the inspection technology.
12 Optimal unemployment insurance designWe take the marginal cost of monitoring to be increasing in σ;t h u sa
more precise technology requires greater eﬀort on the part of those who
monitor search behavior. Finally, the indexation of the monitoring cost
to the aggregate wage level reﬂects the fact that we think of monitoring
as a labor intensive activity.
2.4 Optimal search incentives and screening
Before proceeding to the numerical results let us ask the question: Is
worker search behavior optimal from society’s point of view? The answer is
that, as long as it is optimal to provide some insurance to the unemployed,
search intensity will be too low in equilibrium. The reason is that there is a
“taxation externality” associated with increasing search. If all individuals
supplied additional search, employment would increase and, consequently,
the tax that ﬁnances a given unemployment insurance system would be
lower. Everyone would gain from a lower tax rate since the consumption
wage would be higher. This eﬀect is not taken into account in the private
determination of search; see Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) for details.
If there would have been no argument for improving search incentives,
then we would only have to worry about the screening properties of the
three systems. Workfare is a perfect screen in the sense that it induces all
workers to opt for workfare rather than UA. However, some screening is
also implied by a system with monitoring and sanctions. It is more likely
that UI beneﬁts expire for a non-worker who doesn’t search than for a
searching worker, for a given µ. But we should also care about what the
three systems do to search eﬀort. It is here useful to distinguish between
ex ante eﬀects and ex post eﬀects; the ex ante eﬀect refers to the threat of
UI expiration while the ex post eﬀect refers to the eﬀect on search when
UI has expired. It is also useful to hold the beneﬁt parameters (b, z,a n d
µ) ﬁxed across systems.
Consider, ﬁrst, the ex ante eﬀect. Although, there are empirical results
suggesting that workfare is indeed a threat (e.g. Black et al, 2003), the
threat of workfare must be lower than the threat of unemployment assis-
tance. The reason is, of course, that workers would rather be on workfare
than on unemployment assistance. A system with monitoring and sanc-
tions has the greatest ex ante eﬀect because such a system has the greatest
eﬀect on search incentives for those on UI. Now, consider the ex post eﬀect.
The ex post eﬀect is lowest for workfare. The reasons are twofold. First,
Optimal unemployment insurance design 13workers are, again, better oﬀ on workfare than on unemployment assis-
tance; second, the time requirement in workfare reduces the time available
f o rs e a r c h .T h ee xp o s te ﬀect is presumably somewhat higher in a system
featuring monitoring and sanctions than in the time-limited UI system.8
2.5 Calibration of the model
We take a quarter as the basic time unit and calibrate the model for a
uniform beneﬁts y s t e m ,i . e . ,o n et h a th a sb = z. We set the uniform
wage replacement rate to 30 percent, which approximately corresponds
to uniform characterization of the US unemployment beneﬁts y s t e m ;s e e
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001). The marginal product of labor is nor-
malized to unity. The matching function is of the Cobb-Douglas variety:
h = a(sw)ηv1−η.W es e ta =1 .28 and η =0 .5; the latter is at the upper
end of the estimates in Blanchard and Diamond (1989). We set the bar-
gaining parameter to β = η, which is the optimal value if there would be
no policy interventions; see Hosios (1990).
The remaining parameters, κ, φ,a n dδw, are calibrated with respect
to the worker population. The calibration is such that the unemployment
rate is 6.5 percent, unemployment duration is one quarter, and the partial
equilibrium elasticity of the hazard to employment with respect to beneﬁts
equals 0.5. These calibration points are broadly in line with the recent US
experience.
We also need to assign some values for the number of workers (γ),
the escape rate (ϕ)a n dδn. We think of the potential labor force as
consisting of two groups of individuals. A fraction has a relatively low
preference for leisure and therefore ﬁnds it worthwhile to search when
out of work. Workers in this category constitute the “eﬀective” labor
force. The remaining fraction has a high preference for leisure and does
not search. Somewhat arbitrarily, we assume that the ratio between the
eﬀective and the potential labor force is 0.95.9 The value for the escape
8This statement reﬂects the fact that σ>0( f o rg i v e nb, z,a n dµ)i m p l i e st h a tU I
is more generous since the risk of beneﬁt expiration is lower. Since search intensity on
UA is increasing in the generosity of UI, this will increase the magnitude of the ex post
eﬀect (for given labor market tightness).
9Existing labor force surveys include various measures of “disguised” unemployment.
One category, referred to as “latent job seekers” in Sweden, consists of non-participants
reporting to be willing and able to work although they do not fulﬁll the search criteria
for being classiﬁed as unemployed. Over the period 1995-2002, the ratio between the
14 Optimal unemployment insurance designrate out of unemployment assistance for non-workers (ϕ) was calculated
in the following way. Swedish data on search activity according to the
Labor Force Surveys suggest that 20 percent of workers on UI did not






w =0 .2. Given γ =0 .95, uu
w =0 .065, and µ =0 .5,
we can use equation (12) to back out a value for ϕ. To assign a value
for δn we assumed that non-workers would be willing to search only if
b = z ≤ 0.1. The exact value of δn is only relevant when designing a
system with workfare.
To calculate the numbers for the monitoring and sanctions system we
need an estimate of c(σ) in (18). We used Swedish data and performed
the following calculation to get a reasonable number for this parameter.
In Sweden, the employment oﬃces monitor job search. Job counselors
devote around 30 percent of their time to meetings with job searchers;
see Lundin (2000). The number of employees at the employment oﬃces
is approximately equal to 0.25 percent of the labor force. Therefore, we
took 0.3 × 0.0025 = 0.00075 as an estimate of the real resource cost of
the monitoring and sanctions system relative to GDP. Thus c(σ)µ(γuu
w +
(1 − γ)uu
n) should equal 0.00075. According to Lundin (2000), public
employment service oﬃcers on average have close to two meetings with an
unemployed per quarter. If we set µ =2a n dγuu
w +(1− γ)uu
n to 0.1, this
implies c(σ)=0 .00375 . To proceed we must specify the marginal cost
function. We take a simple linear cost function c(σ)=ψσ and use ψ =0 .02
when we calculate the numbers for the monitoring and sanctions system.
I ts e e m st ou st h a tt h i si saf a i r l yl a r g ev a l u ef o rt h em a r g i n a lc o s to f
monitoring. Still we prefer a “conservative” number since there is genuine
uncertainty about the value of this parameter. Table 1 summarizes the
baseline parameters and Table 2 shows some key outcomes in the baseline
calibration with a uniform beneﬁts y s t e m .
3 A comparison of the policy instruments
3.1 A uniform beneﬁts y s t e m
The baseline calibration features an unemployment rate among workers
(uu
w) of 6.5 percent and unemployed individuals spend 61 percent of their
oﬃcial and the potential labor force (the latter including latent job seekers) was 0.96 in
Sweden.
Optimal unemployment insurance design 15Table 1: Baseline parameters
Description Parameter
Matching technology: h = a(sw)ηv1−η a =1 .282335
η =0 .5
Distribution of individuals and leisure values γ =0 .95
δw =0 .776489
δn =2 .646591
Inﬂow to UI for non-workers ϕ =0 .223327
Marginal product of labor y =1
Separation rate φ =0 .069519
Share parameter in the wage bargain β =0 .5
Marginal cost of monitoring: c(σ)=ψσ ψ =0 .02
time searching for a job; see su
w. Wages (net of taxes) are lower than
the marginal product of labor because of search frictions. In the baseline
calibration, the wage (w) amounts to 89 percent of the marginal product
of labor.
How does search respond to changes in the UI replacement rate? Since
an increase in the replacement rate decreases the gain of ﬁnding employ-
ment, individuals respond by searching less when UI becomes more gen-
erous. As we shall see later, however, this is not necessarily true when we
consider more general UI systems than the one paying a constant wage
replacement rate indeﬁnitely.
We consider Pareto optimal beneﬁt policies and assume that the UI
provider maximizes the expected utility of workers subject to the con-
straint that non-workers receive at least a minimum amount of utility. The
UI provider knows the distribution of workers and non-workers in the pop-
ulation but it cannot tell if an individual is a worker or a non-worker. In
addition to providing insurance, an optimally designed UI system should
ideally screen out non-workers and increase the search intensity among
workers.
Suppose that the base run deﬁnes the minimum utility of non-workers,
i.e., υu
n =l nbw =0 .3 × 0.8891; see column (1) in Table 2. Can we design
an optimal uniform beneﬁt system that is diﬀerent from the base run?
The answer to this question is no. The reason is that with only the wage
replacement rate as an instrument it is impossible to separate the two
16 Optimal unemployment insurance designTable 2: Baseline calibration and a beneﬁt system with time limits
Baseline Optimal system with time limits
(1) (2)
Policy variables
b (UI replacement rate) 0.30 .4958
z (UA replacement rate) — 0.2623
µ — 0.81
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Notes: Superindex u and a refer to UI and UA respectively. Remaining symbols in
t h et a b l ea r ee x p l a i n e di nt h em a i nt e x t . T h ec h a n g ei nw e l f a r e( ε)i sm e a s u r e d
relative to the base run.
Optimal unemployment insurance design 17types. The wage replacement rate is tied down to 30 percent because of
the minimum utility constraint.
3.2 Time limits in beneﬁt receipt
Consider now the case with time limits on UI beneﬁt receipt. The search
intensity among workers depends on whether she is insured or non-insured
(i.e. on UA). If b ≥ z, it is straightforward to verify that su
w ≤ sa
w,t h a ti s ,
a worker searches less intensively when receiving UI (indexed by u)c o m -
pared to UA (indexed by a). The intuition is simply that search intensity
while receiving UI is lower because there is a smaller gain associated with
ﬁnding employment.
What happens to search in each state when we change the replacement
rates? With respect to z the model works much the same as before:
search intensity is falling in the generosity of unemployment assistance.
However, there is a diﬀerential eﬀect of the UI replacement rate. An
increase in b reduces the search intensity of the insured, but increases the
search intensity of the non-insured. The latter eﬀect is the entitlement
eﬀect, ﬁrst highlighted by Mortensen (1977). Those on UA search harder
when UI becomes more generous since employment is a prerequisite for
receiving UI. Since there is a taxation externality associated with search,
an optimal beneﬁt system exploits the entitlement eﬀect by introducing
ﬁnite duration of UI receipt (see Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001).
Now, consider solving for an optimal time-limited UI system. This
involves choosing b, z,a n dµ such that the expected utility among workers
is maximized subject to the minimum utility constraint for non-workers,
the budget constraint, and the market equilibrium constraints.
Figure 1 plots the expected utility of workers for each value of the
beneﬁt expiration rate (µ); remaining policy parameters (b and z)a r es e t
at their optimal values conditional on µ. Figure 1 clearly shows that there
exists a Pareto-optimal policy involving an interior value of µ.A no p t i m a l
policy implies that the expected potential duration of UI beneﬁts (1/µ)
should equal 1.2 quarters (1/0.81).
In column (2) of Table 2 we present the implications of the optimal
system with time limits. The optimal system with time limits gives work-
ers substantially more insurance than the base run. The UI replacement
rate amounts to almost 50 percent of the wage. Since compensation is
more generous, search intensity decreases while receiving UI. The total
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Figure 1: Worker expected utility as a function of the UI expiration
rate
Optimal unemployment insurance design 19unemployment rate among workers and taxes increase. Notice, also, that
the number of individuals receiving UI decreases from 11 to 5 percent.
As a measure of the change in welfare implied by a move to the optimal
system we consider the consumption tax (ε)t h a tw o u l dm a k ew o r k e r s
indiﬀerent between living in the optimal system and the base run.10 As
shown by the last row in Table 2, they would be willing to pay 0.43 percent
of consumption to live in the optimal system with time limits.
3.3 Monitoring and sanctions
Now let us consider monitoring and sanctions. Our incarnation of a mon-
itoring and sanctions system involves one additional parameter — the pre-
cision of the inspection technology, σ.
There are two behavioral implications of introducing a system with
monitoring and sanctions. First of all, for given wage replacement rates,
UI recipients will search harder since an increase in search reduces the risk
of being sanctioned and transferred to UA receipt. Second, workers will
bargain more aggressively. This is because there will be a reduction in the
transition rate to UA receipt given search intensity. In the system with
time limits, the transition rate is µ; in the monitoring and sanctions system
it is µ(1 − σsu
w). The reduction of the transition rate to the least favored
state yields an improvement of workers’ outside opportunities. Therefore,
workers bargain more aggressively — wage costs increase and fewer jobs are
created. All in all, the policy experiment thus has two opposing eﬀects on
employment — search increases but at the same time wage pressure rises —
and the employment eﬀect of the policy is a priori ambiguous.
Figure 2 shows worker expected utility as a function of the monitoring
rate (µ). It is constructed in the same way as Figure 1; that is, for a
given value of µ we choose the remaining policy parameters optimally.
In turns out that all optimal policy combinations involve σ =1 . T h u s
the UI provider should always opt for a precise technology. Presumably,
this result is driven by the assumed cost structure and, therefore, we are
10The consumption tax is equivalent to the change in welfare. To illustrate this,
consider two candidate policies 0 and 1. Let c W1(ε) denote welfare after the imposition
of the consumption tax and W0 denote welfare without the tax. The consumption tax
that makes workers indiﬀerent between the two systems is deﬁned by the solution to
c W1(ε)=W0. Because of our utility function, ε solves W1 +l n ( 1− ε)=W0.I f ε is
small, we have ln(1 − ε) ≈− ε and therefore ε = W1 − W0, i.e. the change in welfare
associated with the two policies.
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Figure 2: Worker expected utility as a function of the monitoring rate
reluctant to place a lot of emphasis on the exact value for σ. Nevertheless,
in Boone et al. (2002) we conclude that the introduction of a system with
monitoring and sanction is a welfare improvement relative to a system
with time limits for reasonable values of monitoring costs. These costs
would have to be implausibly high in order for this conclusion not to hold.
Therefore, we are reasonably comfortable with the conclusion suggested
by a comparison of the welfare scales in Figures 1 and 2, i.e., that workers
are better oﬀ in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in a system
with time limits.
I nc o l u m n( 2 )o fT a b l e3w er e p o r tas e to fo u t c o m e sp e r t a i n i n gt ot h e
system with monitoring and sanctions. For ease of comparison, we give
the outcomes with time limits in column 1.
With monitoring and sanctions, the UI provider can aﬀord to be more
generous to UI recipients. The UI replacement rate equals 63 percent in
a system with monitoring and sanctions; the corresponding number with
time limits is 50 percent. Despite the fact that search intensity increases,
total unemployment among workers increases slightly with monitoring and
Optimal unemployment insurance design 21Table 3: Ab e n e ﬁt system with monitoring and sanctions
Time limits Monitoring and sanctions
(1) (2)
Policy variables
b (UI replacement rate) 0.4958 0.6284
z (UA replacement rate) 0.2623 0.2621
µ 0.81 1.15
σ 01
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Notes: Superindex u and a refer to UI and respectively. Remaining symbols in
the table are explained in the main text. The change in welfare (ε)i sm e a s u r e d
relative to the base run.
22 Optimal unemployment insurance designsanctions. This has to do with the adverse eﬀect on wage setting induced
by an improvement in workers’ outside option. Workers’ outside options
increase both because the UI replacement rate is higher but also because
the introduction of monitoring and sanctions improves workers bargain-
ing position. Since wage costs increase ﬁrms respond by creating fewer
vacancies.
3.4 Workfare
Consider, ﬁnally, how the system works with workfare. We think of a world
where employment oﬃcers administer a “work test” randomly at rate µ.
If the unemployed worker enters workfare she is required to perform some
duties (p) that reduce the time available for other activities; hence, leisure
while participating in workfare is given by  
p
w =1− p − s
p
w. In exchange
for these duties she gets to keep the UI beneﬁt.
As noted by Thustrup Kreiner and Tranæs (2004), workfare is poten-
tially a welfare improving screening device. Consider a beneﬁts y s t e m
that is uniform initially, i.e., b = z. Since preferences for leisure are pri-
vate information to the individuals, both workers and non-workers will
claim and receive beneﬁts. Imagine now that workfare is introduced as
a requirement for beneﬁt receipt along with a slight increase in UI while
keeping UA ﬁxed. The welfare of non-workers is not aﬀected as long as
they avoid workfare and prefer not to search. The welfare of workers may
well increase since they care less about the reduction in leisure associated
with workfare.
Appropriately designed (non-productive) workfare must satisfy two
self-selection constraints. If workfare acts as a screen, it should not be
optimal for workers and non-workers to mimic each other. Thus UI-cum-
workfare must be at least as good as UA for workers, i.e. V
p
w ≥ V a
w.
Analogously, UA must be at least as good as UI-cum-workfare for non-
workers, i.e., V a
n ≥ V
p
n. If it is optimal for workers to opt for UA rather
than workfare, then the model is formally equivalent to the system with
time limits. So the deﬁning constraint on a system with workfare is that
it must not be optimal for non-workers to mimic workers.
If non-workers mimic workers, then it will never be optimal to require
(non-productive) workfare. The reason is that in this case workfare fulﬁls
no screening function, it only imposes costs on workers and non-workers.
Since the time requirement in workfare (p) imposes costs on workers, the
Optimal unemployment insurance design 23Pareto optimal policy featuring workfare will be such that the incentive




If there is an equilibrium with workfare, then no worker will ever be
transferred to unemployment assistance. Only non-workers will end up on
UA. In this sense workfare is the perfect screening device. However, work-
fare is not conducive to search since there is a reduction in the available
leisure time. Hence, it is not obvious that workfare will raise the ex-
pected utility of workers relative to the case with time limits. Moreover,
the existence of a system with workfare depends crucially on whether the
diﬀerence in terms of preferences for leisure is suﬃciently large between
workers and non-workers; see Thustrup Kreiner and Tranæs (2004). Thus
it not clear that a system with workfare dominates a uniform beneﬁts y s -
tem, either.
The policy experiment with workfare amounts to choosing µ, b, z,a n dp
optimally in the same fashion as above. The leisure value for non-workers
is calibrated so that they would not search for a job if in the uniform
system. The ratio between the two leisure values is (δn/δw) ≈ 3.4. Figure
3 graphs the expected utility of workers as a function of rate that the work
test is administered (µ). The ﬁgure shows that there is an interior solution
with workfare but also that the work test should be used infrequently.
Column 2 of Table 4 reports a set of outcomes implied by an optimal
system with workfare. Again, we give the corresponding outcomes with
time limits in column 1 for ease of comparison. As shown in the table, the
UI replacement rate is much lower with workfare than with time limits.
This implies that search intensity on UI is higher than with time limits.
The table also shows that the employment rate among workers turns out
to be equal in the two systems, despite the fact that workfare reduces the
available time for other activities. The fact that the optimal monitoring
rate is very low, µ =0 .09, implies most non-workers will receive UI rather
than UA. Notice ﬁnally that workers would rather live in an optimal sys-
tem with time limits. The prime reason for this result is that there is too
little insurance with workfare.
3.5 Sensitivity analysis
The numerical analysis suggests a case for monitoring and sanctions.
Workfare, on the other hand, seems to be the least preferred option. The
question is how robust these conclusions are with respect to reasonable
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Figure 3: Worker expected utility as a function of the workfare oﬀer
rate
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z (UA replacement rate) 0.2623 0.2425
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Notes: Superindex u (a) refers to UI (UA) and p refers to workfare. Remaining symbols
in the table are explained in the main text. The change in welfare (ε)i sm e a s u r e d
relative to the base run.
26 Optimal unemployment insurance designchanges in the parameters — such as the marginal cost of monitoring — and
the structure of the model.
We argued earlier that the marginal cost of monitoring is probably on
the high side in the baseline case. Obviously, lowering this value would
only strengthen our conclusions. Also, we think that the qualitative results
are insensitive to varying individual risk aversion. In Fredriksson and
Holmlund (2001) we show that increasing risk aversion does not aﬀect the
case for a time-limited UI system (in comparison to a uniform one).11
The most novel of our results is probably that the case for workfare is
weak, at least when comparing to the other two policy instruments. Can
we overturn this qualitative conclusion in some way? Two aspects of the
model strike us as particularly relevant in this respect. The ﬁrst, and most
obvious one, is the fact that we have modelled workfare as a completely
unproductive activity. The second, more subtle point, is that we have
modelled search intensity as a relatively elastic margin.
Let us begin with the ﬁrst point. Consider the following question: How
much more productive would workfare have to be in order to deliver the
same expected utility for workers as in the time-limited case? To address
this question we add the production in workfare to the revenue side of the
government budget constraint and calculate the marginal product of labor
in workfare that makes the two systems equivalent.12 It turns out that
workfare is equivalent to time limits if the marginal product in workfare
amounts to 68 percent of the marginal product in regular jobs. This strikes
us as a high number, in particular since we are assuming that there are
no direct crowding out eﬀects associated with public employment and we
are ignoring any direct costs of running the workfare system.
Now, consider the second point. The case for a time-limited system or
a system with monitoring and sanctions hinges on the hazard to employ-
ment being responsive to incentives; in other words, search intensity must
respond to incentives. Absent such responsiveness, we should only care
about the screening properties of each system and workfare would clearly
be superior to the other two systems. However, search being completely
unresponsive to incentives is a highly implausible case that has been safely
rejected by the empirical literature. Let us instead calibrate the model so
as to get a substantially lower elasticity of the job hazard with respect to
11We have also conducted some sensitivty analysis with respect to the other parame-
ters. The results appear to rather insensitive to moderate variations in ϕ,f o ri n s t a n c e .
12All policy parameters are recalculated such that they are the optimal ones.
Optimal unemployment insurance design 27beneﬁts. In particular, choose parameters such that this elasticity equals
0.1, which is the lower bound of the available empirical estimates. Let
us further assume that non-workers are extremely unwilling to search and
work. In particular, assume that they would be willing to search for a job
only if b = z ≤ 0.01 (implying that it is easy to screen out non-workers
when subjecting them to a work-test). This strategy yields two new values
for δw and δn; relative to our baseline case there is a more than ten-fold
increase in the ratio of the two.13
Figure 4 graphs the result of this exercise. As the ﬁgure shows work-
fare is inferior to the other two systems for all values of µ. We think that
the message delivered by Figure 4 applies fairly generally. The case con-
sidered is close to the most potent case for workfare. Since it is very easy
to deter non-workers from claiming UI cum workfare, the time require-
ment that screens out non-workers from the system is very small. Then
workers are not penalized by being subjected to a work test. In this ex-
treme case, workfare enables the UI provider to design what is eﬀectively
a uniform beneﬁt system that is optimal for workers. In Fredriksson and
Holmlund (2001) we showed that a system with time limits always domi-
nates the optimal uniform system. Therefore, we are reasonably conﬁdent
in saying that workfare can never outperform time limits, given that the
duties performed on workfare are unproductive. Of course, as suggested
b yt h ea n a l y s i sa b o v e ,m a t t e r sm a yb ed i ﬀerent if there was some valuable
production going on while participating in workfare.
4 Discussion
The three measures that we have considered are alternative ways of en-
couraging search activity while at the same time discouraging non-workers
from claiming UI beneﬁts. A common feature of the systems is that they
m a k ei tp o s s i b l ef o rt h eU Ip r o v i d e rt oo ﬀer more generous compensation
to workers than would be feasible with a uniform beneﬁts y s t e m .W o r k e r s
will, therefore, prefer a UI system featuring time limits, monitoring and
sanctions, or workfare to a system paying a constant wage replacement
rate indeﬁnitely.
The numerical analysis suggests a case for a monitoring and sanctions
system. Since the system with monitoring and sanctions gives additional
13The ratio of the two leisure value increases from 3.4 to 38.
















Figure 4: A comparison of the policy instruments when search
elasticity is low and it is easy to screen out non-workers
Optimal unemployment insurance design 29incentives to search, so as to avoid being transferred to UA, the UI provider
can oﬀer more insurance to the unemployed workers. One caveat to this
conclusion may be that monitoring and sanctions raise the incentive to
substitute formal search for informal search, as argued by van den Berg
and van der Klaauw (2001). This is a complication that we have not
considered in our numerical exercise. If informal and formal search are
perfect substitutes then monitoring and sanctions will just be costly and
b r i n gn ob e n e ﬁts in terms of restoring search incentives. Still it is diﬃcult
to believe that they are perfect substitutes; presumably there are some
economies of scale of having search organized via the employment oﬃces.
Another caveat in the case for monitoring and sanctions is that the
costs of the system are diﬃcult to estimate. Nevertheless, in Boone et al.
(2002) we showed that the costs of introducing monitoring and sanctions
would have to be implausibly large in order to overturn the conclusion
that monitoring and sanctions is a welfare improvement relative to time
limits.
The numerical results are less favorable to the case for workfare. Work-
fare is a perfect screening device — in the sense that workers are never
subjected to unemployment assistance — but it is not conducive to search.
Therefore, the UI provider sets a lower UI replacement rate than in the
systems with time limits and monitoring and sanctions. With preference
heterogeneity as the only source of heterogeneity and unproductive work-
fare, we think that this conclusion applies fairly generally.
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